Pat Cox:
The Treaty of Lisbon

Julkaistu 14.12.2009

  Aloita keskustelu

On November 9th 2009 twenty nine heads of state and government from Europe and Russia gathered in Berlin to mark the twentieth anniversary of the collapse of the Berlin Wall and of 1989 as the year of the peaceful revolutions that changed the face of contemporary Europe. By 1989 plans were already at an advanced stage to launch an Intergovernmental Conference to establish an Economic and Monetary Union to complement the emerging Single Market.  Suddenly a tidal wave of hope and history washed over this carefully prepared policy terrain as Europe was confronted for the first time since the Second World War, in the words of Pope John Paul II,  with the challenge of ‘breathing through her two lungs East and West’.

There were anxieties in some quarters that, as German reunification loomed larger on the political horizon; the European ideal would be eclipsed by a new powerhouse in Mitteleuropa, a kind of Germanified Europe. Helmut Kohl, as German Chancellor, stamped his authority on the alternative of a Europeanised and reunited Germany by promoting the idea of a Political Union to parallel the Economic and Monetary Union and committing Germany to lead the drive towards a common European currency to replace the iconic Deutschmark. The strong and stable Deutschmark, managed by a fiercely independent Bundesbank, anchored the post war economy and democracy of the Federal Republic. It stood strong, the answer to the collective German memory of hyperinflation, a collapsing currency and the imploding Weimar Republic that paved the way for the Nazis. For Kohl, the Euro and a shared European perspective would be the new anchor for the new Germany. The Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) was to be its European legal, institutional and political expression.

This was followed by the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, the failed attempt of the Constitutional Treaty and, finally, the Lisbon Treaty which entered force on December 1st. Separately and collectively these represent a twenty year period of adjustment to the consequences of the fall of the Berlin Wall. They reflect the incremental nature of European integration and the difficulty of unanimously agreeing sensitive political trade-offs, especially when each successive enlargement added to the diversity of the Union and the difficulty of securing unanimity.  From conception to birth what finally emerged as the Lisbon Treaty was the most difficult, but not the most ambitious, of the treaties of the past two decades and its adoption marks a watershed in EU affairs. It has consumed an enormous amount of political capital and will not be repeated as an exercise any time soon. Future treaty changes, if and when needed, are likely to be more specific and less generic, which is in part anticipated by the terms of the Lisbon Treaty itself.  

With the nomination of Herman van Rompuy to the Presidency of the European Council and Baroness Cathy Ashton as the High Representative for Foreign Policy the EU’s new personnel and new architecture are now in place and ready to roll, subject to upcoming European Parliamentary hearings. After years of delay the EU is now liberated from needing to focus on questions of design to the question of delivery.  A period of learning by doing is at hand but the scale of the internal and global challenges now facing the EU demands a sense of urgency on all fronts.

The democratic accountability of the system will be greatly enhanced through the new role for national parliaments and improved powers of the European Parliament. The latter can be expected to make maximum use of its new powers. One of the innovative strengths that served Europeans well in the past has been the community method of decision making which valued a strong Commission dedicated to pursuing the common European interest. As drafted, the Lisbon Treaty proposed a smaller Commission with less than one member per state precisely to reinvigorate this sense of common European purpose. Ireland’s price for a second referendum restored a Commissioner per state and altered the carefully reconstructed institutional balance and risks reinforcing the EU’s creeping intergovernmentalism.

As an antidote, the new Commission needs to reveal a strong self belief that its mission is political and not merely administrative. It will need to develop a solid working relationship with the European Parliament as a natural but not uncritical strategic ally and new structures and methods to connect with national parliaments. Having European convictions and the courage to promote them will be crucial to securing its mandate from the European Parliament.  While striking a balance between policy aspirations and capacity to act will be vital for credibility with the Council.

How to consolidate the fragile economic recovery, how to restore credibility to the banking and financial system, how to harness the welcome emphasis on a low carbon economy to ensure sustainable growth, how to shape a budgetary strategy fit for future purpose and how to innovative social and economic policy to deliver tomorrow’s jobs will dominate debate on internal policies. While realising the EU’s weight in the world in terms of commercial, development and security policies will be the critical external policy challenge post Lisbon. The key to success will lie in a level of ambition that seeks to do enough well and in depth rather than too much poorly and thinly.

Pat Cox
President
European Movement International

  

Keskustelu